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      : 
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HONORABLE SHEILA McCLEEVE, JUDGE, PRESIDING. 
 
-------o0o------- 
BARTON J. WARREN, Bar#7787 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
261 East 300 South, Suite 175 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
 
STATE OF UTAH,    :  
Plaintiff/Appellee,    :   
     :  
v.       :   Appeal No. 20070159  
      :  
RYAN DRAPER,    :    
 Defendant/Appellant.   : 
 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
 
 
I. DRAPER HAS DEMONSTRATED THE OUTCOME OF HIS CASE 
WAS PREJUDICED BY KRAFT’S ERRORS, THUS SATISFYING 
STRICKLAND’S SECOND PRONG OF THE INEFFECTIVENESS 
TEST.  
 
In the Brief of Appellee, the State1 concedes, “…defense counsel was deficient in 
not hiring a handwriting analyst.” Brief of Appellee at p. 28. However, the State attempts 
to argue Draper failed to establish Kraft was deficient in not challenging the foundation 
of Cory’s testimony concerning Draper’s handwriting, both as an expert and non-expert. 
Id. at pp. 20-22. The State further argues Draper was not prejudiced by Kraft’s failure to 
hire a handwriting analyst because the evidence of Draper’s guilt was compelling. Id. at 
p. 28. The State attempts to argue that Kraft “…made a legitimate strategic choice to use 
the identification [made by Cory of Draper’s handwriting] to advance the defense.” Brief 
of Appellee at p. 26. The State is mistaken in its assertion that Kraft’s deficiency was not 
prejudicial on the outcome of this case, as established below.  
                                                 
1 Terms not defined herein are afforded the meanings as defined in the Brief of Appellant.  
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As cited to in Brief of Appellant and which warrants further analysis herein, the 
Utah Supreme Court has stated the following concerning an attorney’s responsibility to 
investigate:  
[C]ounsel has an important duty to “adequately investigate the underlying 
facts” of the case because investigation sets the foundation for counsel's 
strategic decisions about how to build the best defense. As explained by the 
United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
686-87, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), [S]trategic choices made 
after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options 
are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than 
complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable 
professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other 
words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.  
 
State v, Hales, 2007 UT 14, ¶69, 152 P.3d 321. Hales continues as follows: 
Under Strickland, even when counsel’s performance is inadequate, a 
defendant who has been convicted of a crime is not entitled to a new trial 
unless the defendant establishes that “there is a reasonable probability that, 
absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt 
respecting guilt.”  “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the [jury verdict].”  Because “[s]ome errors will 
have had a pervasive effect on the inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture, and some will have had an 
isolated trivial effect,” in determining the effect of the error, we “consider 
the totality of the evidence before the ... jury.”  
 
Ibid. at ¶86.  Draper has thus commenced the difficult task to demonstrate the prejudice 
he suffered due to Kraft’s ineffectiveness at trial. “[I]t is exceedingly difficult to 
withdraw from the minds of jurors, or from any mind, suggestions of immaterial facts, 
insinuations of misleading rules of action, or arguments which arouse passion or 
prejudice[.]” London Guarantee & Acc. Co. v. Woelfle, 83 F.2d 325, 340 (8th Cir. 1936) 
citing Union Pac. R. Co. v. Field, 137 F. 14, 15 (8th Cir. 1905).  
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 In a case dealing with false testimony given at trial, the court noted in a footnote 
that, “[i]t is, of course, not possible to predict precisely the impact of any item of 
information on a jury collectively or its members individually. This Court believes, 
however, that the impact of any given fact will vary, depending on how much other 
information the jury possesses.” U.S. v. Nacrelli, 543 F.Supp. 798, 800 (D.C.Pa., 1982).  
The Utah Supreme Court has determined, “…this court has noted that pursuant to our 
‘inherent supervisory power over the courts,’ we may presume prejudice in circumstances 
where it is ‘unnecessary and ill-advised to pursue a case-by-case inquiry to weigh actual 
prejudice.’” State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah,1996) citing Parsons v. Barnes, 
871 P.2d 516, 523 n. 6 (Utah 1994)  quoting State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 857, 859 
(Utah 1992).   
In the instant matter, the State argues, “…Defendant’s trial counsel made a 
legitimate strategic choice to use the identification to advance the defense.” Brief of 
Appellee at p. 26. “Stated differently, Defendant’s denial of unchallengable [sic] facts of 
his misdeeds not only exposed his consciousness of guilt, it unraveled his defense that he 
was not, at least, a party to the forgeries.” Id. at p. 30. The State relies on speculative and 
unsupported statements in support of its argument that Draper has not satisfied 
Strickland’s second prong: “The only way to cover a theft of cash is to turn over a lesser 
amount of the cash than was collected from the client, along with a dummy invoice 
reflecting the lesser amount;” “[Defendant] obtained the cash that motivated the 
forgeries, and was so necessarily complicit in the scheme;” “Although counsel was not 
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specific, the reference is certainly to Hansen’s testimony that Defendant insisted that he 
had collected only $122 from Goff.” Brief of Appellee at pp. 32, 33, 34. However, these 
inferences take on a different connotation when considered with the testimony from the 
Remand Hearing.  
Draper testified at the Remand Hearing that, at every meeting with Kraft, he 
inquired how the search for an expert was progressing. Supp. Tr. at pp. 66-67. To his 
detriment, Draper relied on Kraft’s advice that he could not find one and that their 
defense was sufficient without one. See, Supp. Tr. at p. 74-75. The Findings credit 
Draper’s testimony at the Remand Hearing that Draper and Kraft “did not mutually 
decide against hiring an expert and that counsel told Defendant that they would not have 
an expert because counsel could not find one.” See, R0265. The trial court based this 
finding on two (2) factors, to wit: (1) that Cropp’s meticulous records indicated no 
contact with Kraft during the relevant time period and (2) Draper “seemed more certain 
in his memory of events than did counsel.” Id. While the trial court found this 
determination to only slightly balance in Draper’s favor, it found Draper’s memory of 
events to be more credible. R0266. Furthermore, “[Kraft] testified that he had always 
been able to find an expert…[Kraft] specifically stated that he had spoken with Ms. 
Cropp, a handwriting expert, regarding another case and could have consulted her in this 
case if necessary.” R0265.  
The trial court further found that it was Cropp’s expert opinion that Draper was 
“probably not” the author of State’s Exhibit 2, “most probably not” the author of State’s 
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Exhibits 4 and 6, and that Cropp would have testified as such at trial. R0266-0267. The 
trial court additionally found that “it is possible another qualified expert would have 
reached a different conclusion from Ms. Cropp.” R0266.   
The facts set forth by the State do not contemplate the prejudice Draper suffered 
because an expert did not testified at trial. As further explored post, the facts relied upon 
by the State could also be construed as a young man who wished to avoid false charges, 
arrest, and imprisonment.  The State further attempts to distract this Court from the 
prejudicial value of Kraft’s ineffectiveness. Kraft had an important duty to adequately 
investigate the underlying facts of Draper’s case because such investigation sets the 
foundation for Kraft’s strategic decisions about how to build the best defense. Hales at 
¶69. Kraft clearly did not investigate into locating and hiring Cropp during the pertinent 
time period, particularly in light of Cropp’s meticulous records. See, R0265. Hence, Kraft 
could not have made a reasonable professional judgment not to pursue hiring an expert 
and, in failing to do so, failed to introduce at trial that Draper was “probably not” the 
author of State’s Exhibit 2 and “most probably not” the author of State’s Exhibits 4 and 
6. R0266-0267. Such testimony would have been not only invaluable in Draper’s defense 
but the absence thereof indicates the glaring prejudice suffered by Draper.      
    Had Cropp’s testimony been introduced at trial, there is more than a reasonable 
probability that, absent Kraft’s deficiencies, the jury would have had reasonable doubt 
respecting Draper’s guilt. Hales at ¶86. Hence, Cropp’s testimony alters the entire 
evidentiary picture. Id. However, demonstrating or measuring the prejudice suffered is a 
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difficult task.  While Draper can demonstrate a reasonable probability the verdict would 
have been different had Cropp testified at trial, it is “not possible to predict precisely the 
impact of any item of information on a jury collectively or its members individually.” 
Nacrelli at 800. Hence, while Draper contends Cory’s testimony was the most damaging 
as it was the only testimony that pointed to the handwriting as Draper’s, it is impossible 
to predict precisely the impact of Cory’s testimony had on the jury, collectively or 
individually. Id. However, in view of the information available to the jury, it is highly 
probable that the jury relied on Cory’s testimony that the handwriting was Draper’s since 
no other opinion was presented. Id. Therefore, this Court should find Kraft’s 
ineffectiveness prejudiced Draper in this matter, particularly since Kraft knew of Cropp, 
had used her services as a graphologist previously to Draper’s case, and likely would 
have hired her again, had he not performed deficiently in this case.   
II. DRAPER HAS ADEQUATELY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE IN 
THIS CASE.  
 
In its Brief of Appellee ,the State requests this Court to presume the sufficiency of 
evidence in this matter due to Draper’s failure to marshal the evidence. Brief of Appellee 
at p. 36. However, the State ignores the adequate marshaling Draper demonstrated in 
Brief of Appellant. While the State’s citation to caselaw concerning the marshaling 
requirement may be accurate, it is inapplicable to this matter. See, Brief of Appellee at pp. 
36-37.  Therefore, the State’s request on this issue should be ignored.   
The marshaling standard, “…requires appellants to marshal all the evidence in 
support of the trial court’s findings and then demonstrate that even viewing it in the light 
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most favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings.” 
State v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345, 1351 (Utah App.,1991) citing State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 
738 (Utah App.1990) quoting Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985) 
(internal quotations omitted). Day continues as follows:  
The court must “view the evidence, along with the reasonable inferences 
from it, in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Id. (citing State v. 
Gardner 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989)). It is proper for us to reverse the 
jury's guilty verdict only if “the evidence and its inferences are so 
‘inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 
(Utah 1983)). It is the role of the jury to weigh the evidence and assess the 
credibility of the witnesses. “[S]o long as some evidence and reasonable 
inferences support the jury's findings, we will not disturb them.” Id. (citing 
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)). 
 
Id. In a case requiring marshaling of the evidence, the Utah Supreme Court determined, 
“[h]e has not acknowledged, let alone marshaled, the evidence presented at trial.” State v. 
Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, ¶14, 989 P.2d 1065.  
The Brief of Appellant cites to the following facts, which the State contends were 
not properly marshaled: Cory called Draper to inform him of discrepancies in Goff’s 
invoice and asked Draper what happened. Tr. at p. 69. Cory testified that Draper’s 
response was, “they were lying.” Tr. at p. 70. Cory testified that Draper told him that 
State’s Exhibit No. 2 reflected the correct charge of $122 and that was the figure he had 
charged Goff. Tr. at p. 71. Cory then met with Draper on July 18, 2005, with police 
officers. Id. Draper was arrested. Tr. at p. 72. Cory testified that, either later that day or 
the next day, Draper called him to say that Cory did not have to involve the police and 
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that he would have made it right. Id. The preceding facts are contained in Brief of 
Appellant at pp. 10-11. Therefore, the State is unable to point to a specific fact Draper 
omitted from Brief of Appellant. The State also attempts to construe the preceding facts 
as evidence of Draper’s guilt. Brief of Appellee at pp. 36-39. However, in viewing these 
facts with Kraft’s failures as Draper’s counsel, such facts could also be construed as a 
scared and innocent young man who would have made this matter right to avoid arrest 
and imprisonment. 
The State thus contends Draper has failed to meet the marshaling requirement and 
further argues the evidence was sufficient to convict Draper. Brief of Appellee at pp. 37-
38. The State relies on two (2) facts to support its assertion: “[i]t is undisputed that the 
invoices Defendant submitted to his employer – State’s Exhibits 2, 4, and 6 – bore 
signatures of the victims that were not genuine. It is also undisputed that the invoices 
retained by the victims – State’s Exhibits 1, 3, and 5 – reflected their payment to 
Defendant of larger amounts of cash than was reflected on State’s Exhibits 2, 4, and 6.” 
Brief of Appellee at p. 38 (citations to the record omitted).   The State misconstrues the 
Brief of Appellant by immediately ignoring the facts of this case and only focusing on 
those that distract from the ultimate issue. Draper’s main contention on appeal involves 
Kraft’s ineffectiveness as counsel at trial in this matter. Draper contends that Kraft was 
specifically ineffective for failing to object or require a proper foundation be laid for 
Cory’s testimony concerning Draper’s handwriting and Kraft’s failure to hire a 
handwriting expert to testify at trial. Additionally, Draper argues on appeal that, 
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regardless of these failures, the verdict was still unsupported by the evidence due to the 
State’s inability to definitively prove Draper was the guilty party, particularly since 
Matheny was incarcerated for similar charges.  
Draper has properly marshaled the evidence. Draper has further demonstrated the 
evidence, even in a favorable light to the verdict, is insufficient to support it. Day at 1351. 
Draper properly acknowledged the evidence and its inferences that were favorable to the 
verdict; however, he has also demonstrated the evidence and its inferences are so 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that Draper was guilty. Day at 1351 and Hopkins at ¶14.  
It is noteworthy that, in response to Brief of Appellant, the State completely 
forsook the Remand Findings. The Remand Findings state, “Ms. Cropp testified that as to 
Exhibit 2, Defendant was ‘probably not’ the author and as to Exhibits 4 and 6, Defendant 
was ‘most probably not’ the author.” R0266. The Remand Findings continue, “…Ms. 
Cropp testified that ‘most probably not written by’ was akin to over 90% certainty that 
Defendant was not the author. She further stated that ‘probably not written by’ equated to 
approximately 80% or higher certainty that Defendant was not the author of the 
invoices.” R0266-0267.  Not only has Draper properly marshaled the evidence in this 
matter, he has also demonstrated the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict.  
III. THE STATE CANNOT NOW CHANGE ITS POSITION ON 
APPEAL.  
 
In an attempt to defeat Draper’s UT. R. EVID. 701 argument, the State argues in its 
Brief of Appellee, “[t]hus, contrary to Defendant’s innuendo, the State did not call Cory 
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Hansen to give testimony as to his ‘specialized knowledge’ in detecting forgeries.  
Indeed, he never testified that any writing was a forgery.” Brief of Appellee at p. 21. 
“Rather, he simply confirmed that, being familiar with Defendant’s handwriting from 
their workplace, the description of the work on the invoices appeared to be in 
Defendant’s handwriting.” Id.  However, as further explained post, the State cannot 
change their position on appeal for it was clearly its intention at trial that Cory testified 
the handwriting on the work orders was Draper’s.  
The Utah Supreme Court stated that, “[f]or an appellate court to permit a party 
who has tried his case in the lower court wholly or in part on a certain theory, which 
theory was acted on by the trial court, to change his position, and adopt another and 
different theory on appeal, would not be only unfair to the trial court, but manifestly 
unjust to the opposing litigant; especially when, as in the case at bar, respondent insisted 
on trying the case in the lower court on the theory now contended for in part by appellant, 
but which, in pursuance of objections made by her, was overruled by the court.”  Lebcher 
v. Lambert, 23 Utah 1, 63 P. 628 (Utah 1900).  A party cannot change their theory of the 
case on appeal from that presented to the court below.  See, 5 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and 
Error § 546; Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah.2d 266, 272 P.2d 185 (1954). 
The purpose of Cory’s testimony at trial was to testify the handwriting on the 
disputed invoices was Draper’s. Cory testified that he was familiar with Draper’s 
handwriting and identified the writing on State’s Exhibits No. 2, 4, and 6 as Draper’s. Tr. 
at p. 67. None of the other witnesses delivered testimony amounting to the elements 
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contained in the forgery charges.  It was clearly the State’s intention below that Cory 
testify that the handwriting contained in the work orders at issue was Draper’s 
handwriting. If the State’s stance on appeal is adopted, that Cory’s testimony was only to 
give evidence about the work contained in the work order, then the State failed to present 
any evidence pertaining to the elements of the forgery charges, and Draper’s sufficiency 
challenge is further supported. UT. R. APP. P. 24.  It would be manifestly unjust to allow 
the State to change its theory of the case on appeal, particularly when Draper has relied 
upon the conviction for forgery to raise this matter on appeal and extensively challenge 
his counsel’s ineffectiveness.  Lebcher, supra.  However, should this Court determine 
that the State’s alternate theory is meritorious, then Draper’s sufficiency challenge 
prevails in that no other evidence was presented as to the elements of that charge and it 
should thus be reversed. 
IV. DRAPER IS NOT REQUIRED TO BRIEF EVERY ISSUE RAISED 
IN HIS DOCKETING STATEMENT OR F ROM REMAND.  
 
In its Brief of Appellee, the State argues that, despite raising an issue pertaining to 
UT. R. EVID. 901 when remand was requested pursuant to UT. R. APP. P. 23B, Draper has 
failed to brief the issue in Brief of Appellant and any argument relating thereto should not 
be considered by this Court. Brief of Appellee at pp. 22-27. The State is correct that 
Draper did not raise the issue pertaining to UT. R. EVID. 901, but instead raised the same 
under UT. R. EVID. 701. Draper is not required to raise the issue similarly to that of either 
his docketing statement or his Rule 23B motion. 
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UT. R. APP. P. 23B allows for “…supplementation of the record, in limited 
circumstances, with nonspeculative facts not fully appearing in the record that would 
support the claimed deficient performance and the resulting prejudice.” State v. Johnston, 
2000 UT App. 290, ¶7, 13 P.3d 175 (emphasis added). UT. R. APP. P. 24 does not require 
that every issue raised in the docketing statement be briefed in the opening brief.  Draper 
has concentrated on key issues on appeal that are most indicative of Kraft’s prejudicial 
deficiencies and the errors below. Draper is interested in focusing this matter on the most 
significant and essential issues raised in Brief of Appellant.  
The State avers, “[i]n fact, Defendant relied on rule 901 and related case law in 
moving this Court for a rule 23B remand. However, Defendant on appeal has 
substantially abandoned rule 901 as the legal basis for his claim that Mr. Kraft 
ineffectively failed to challenge Hansen’s testimony.” Brief of Appellee at p. 23 (internal 
citations to the record omitted). The State continues, “Defendant has failed to provide any 
meaningful analysis or relevant authority in support of his rule 901 argument, or a 
sufficient record in support of that argument. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss the 
claim as inadequately briefed and speculative.” Id (internal citations to the record 
omitted).  
Draper argued that, as a layperson, Cory would be unqualified to testify to the 
handwriting on the work orders as being Draper’s. This is supported by Cropp’s 
testimony that it would not be in the lay person’s purview to be able to see through a 
forgery. Supp. Tr. at p. 54. Therefore, after the Remand Hearing, Draper determined to 
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only brief the issue pertaining to Cory as it relates to UT. R. EVID. 701.  Draper reminds 
this Court that the purpose of UT. R. APP. P. 23B is to supplement the record on appeal 
with nonspeculative facts not fully appearing in the record that would support counsel’s 
deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Johnston at ¶7. Hence, with the 
supplemented record this Court now has in this matter, it would not be in the lay person’s 
purview to be able to see through a forgery. Supp. Tr. at p. 54. Therefore, Draper opted 
to brief this issue as it pertains to UT. R. EVID. 701, which was adequately preserved and 
briefed according to Utah law.  
The Brief of Appellant is more than adequate for this Court’s review. The brief 
substantially complies with UT. R. APP. P. 24 and includes the standard of review for 
each issue raised with supporting authority, sufficient statements of facts and the case, 
and legal analysis in support of the issues raised therein. Therefore, this Court should 
reach the merits of each issue raised and rule accordingly.  
CONCLUSION 
  
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, Draper respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the Verdict in this matter and take any such further action as this Court deems 
necessary.   
DATED this 7th day of May, 2009. 
____________________________________ 
Barton J. Warren 
      Attorney for Ryan Draper  
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